Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 42 | Issue 1

2009

Guantanamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District
Court's Decisions Consistent with IHL Internment
Standards
Laura M. Olson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Laura M. Olson, Guantanamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court's Decisions Consistent with IHL Internment Standards, 42 Case
W. Res. J. Int'l L. 197 (2009)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/34

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW: ARE THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT’S
DECISIONS CONSISTENT WITH IHL INTERNMENT STANDARDS?
Laura M. Olson *
After the Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush that the detainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility are entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention, the D.C.
District Court started to take action on the hundreds of petitions filed. In
these habeas proceedings, the court has faced the threshold legal question
of the scope of the government’s authority to detain pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force as informed by the law of war. This article reviews how the court has delimited the permissible bounds of the government’s detention authority, specifically focusing on whether the court’s
decisions are consistent with the internment standards under the law of war,
international humanitarian law (IHL). This analysis seeks to assess whether
the court’s application of the Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy
combatant” or the new definition provided by the Obama Administration is
broader or narrower than the IHL standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that statutory habeas
jurisdiction extended to Guantánamo, 1 those detained at the Guantánamo
Bay detention facility filed hundreds of petitions. No action, however, was
taken on the petitions until the Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in Boumediene
v. Bush that Guantánamo detainees are “entitled to the privilege of habeas
corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.” 2 As of this writing, the
D.C. District Court has ruled on thirty-five petitions, granting twenty-nine,
under both the Bush and Obama Administrations. 3
*
Laura M. Olson, J.D., LL.M., is Senior Counsel at the Constitution Project and President of Blackletter Consulting, LLC. She previously served for ten years as legal advisor to
the ICRC. The views expressed in this article reflect those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Constitution Project or of Blackletter Consulting, LLC.
1
See 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2006)).
2
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
3
See Carol Rosenberg, Judge Orders Release of Yemeni From Guantánamo, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/
guantanamo/story/1191864.html (reporting that “Kessler’s ruling raised to 29 the number of
long-held Guantánamo captives that federal judges have ordered released . . . compared with
the six whose detentions that judges have upheld.”). An additional petition was denied just as
this article was submitted, thus, that case is not included in this analysis: Al Odah, et al. v.
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In these habeas proceedings, the D.C. District Court has faced the
threshold legal question: “what is the scope of the government’s authority to
detain these, and other, detainees pursuant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force . . . , as informed by the law of war?” 4 This article reviews
how the District Court has delimited “‘[t]he permissible bounds’ of the government’s detention authority ‘as subsequent cases are presented to them.’”5
Specifically, the focus is on whether the D.C. District Court’s decisions are
consistent with the internment standards under the law of war, international
humanitarian law (IHL). As internment, 6 the deprivation of a person’s liberty without criminal charge as a preventive security measure, is an extreme
measure even in armed conflict, IHL set limits on its use. This analysis
seeks to assess whether application by the D.C. District Court of the Bush
Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant” or the new definition
provided by the Obama Administration is broader or narrower than the IHL
standards.
The applicable conventional IHL rules vary depending upon whether an armed conflict is international or non-international. There exist fewer
rules applicable to non-international armed conflict and, in contrast to IHL
applicable to international armed conflict, there are no conventional IHL
rules providing a basis for internment in non-international armed conflicts.
The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld concluded that, at the very
least, Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions applies to the U.S.
conflict with al-Qaeda because it is a “conflict not of an international character.” 7 Many of the individuals currently held at Guantánamo were deUnited States et al., Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2730489, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug.
24, 2009) (denying Al Odah’s petition—the oldest of the pending Guantánamo Bay habeas
cases).
4
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
5
Id. at 66 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004)).
6
In this article, the term “internment” and occasionally the more general term “detention”
will be used to refer to preventive detention without charge or what is also called security or
administration detention.
7
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–31 (2006) (citing Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions, see First Geneva Convention, infra note 10, art. 3) (emphasis
added). The armed conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates how conflicts can evolve. It is generally agreed that an international armed conflict in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001
between U.S. and coalition forces and the Taliban and its allied forces (i.e., al-Qaeda). While
it has not always been agreed, experts have contended that this international armed conflict
ended on June 19, 2002 (with the convening of the Loya Jirga that established the Interim
Government of Afghanistan). See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for
International Law?, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 71, 76–77 (2004). After June 19, 2002, the conflict then transformed into a non-international armed conflict, internationalized by the presence of the United States and coalition forces, between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and Afghanistan (supported by the United States and coalition forces). Id. at 82. The United States has
claimed that an armed conflict has been ongoing prior to September 11, 2001—since the
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tained in relation to that conflict. Thus, much of the discussion on internment in this article concerns the extent to which analogous application of
IHL internment standards applicable to international armed conflict is appropriate in non-international armed conflict and, if so, in which form. 8
The first section of this article provides background by briefly describing the bases for internment under conventional IHL and explaining
how IHL of international armed conflict could be analogously applied to
non-international armed conflicts in order to address internment. The following section discusses the executive branch’s practice of internment at
Guantánamo, assessing both the asserted legal bases for internment and the
various internment standards in relation to IHL. The third section reviews
the D.C. District Court’s interpretation of the executive’s internment standards to see if the court’s decisions are consistent with IHL internment
standards. This review and accompanying analysis modestly seeks to
present some initial reflections on these issues and by no means intends to
be exhaustive.
II. INTERNMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL
In peacetime, as during armed conflict, persons may be detained
awaiting trial for a crime or based upon conviction for a crime. For the individual non-state actor, participation in the conflict generally constitutes a
crime under the domestic law of the state affected by the conflict. This secbombings of the U.S. embassies (August 7, 1998) in the East African capital cities of Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya and the U.S.S. Cole (October 12, 2000) in Yemen.
The Supreme Court in Hamdan did not question the U.S. assertion that an armed conflict
with al-Qaeda began on September 11, 2001, however, the Court did not assert that it began
prior to that date. Without explicitly stating the classification of the conflict, the Court found
that Common Article 3 applied. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–31. The Court rejected the Bush
Administration’s argument that the conflict with al-Qaeda was an international armed conflict based on the reasoning that an international armed conflict can only be between states.
Id. But see First Additional Protocol, infra note 27, art. 1(4). The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that a non-international armed conflict can only occur within the territory of a single state. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631. Thus, the Court appears to have concluded that
the conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a non-international armed conflict as understood
for application of Common Article 3.
8
“According to the government, then, because the law of war has evolved primarily in
the context of international armed conflicts between nations, the President has the authority
to detain ‘those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida or the Taliban would, in appropriately
analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render them detainable.’” Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009) (citing Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees
Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442
(TFH) (D.C. Cir. March 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
memo-re-det-auth.pdf [hereinafter March 13 Memo]).
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tion focuses on that which is more unique to armed conflicts—internment of
enemies without criminal charge as a preventive security measure, specifically the internment of prisoners of war and, under certain circumstances,
civilians. This section describes the possible bases under IHL for this particular form of deprivation of liberty in international and non-international
armed conflict.
A.

IHL Bases for Internment: When to Hold and When to Release 9

IHL provides grounds for possible internment in international
armed conflict under certain conditions for specific categories of protected
persons. The First and Second Geneva Conventions regulate the retention of
medical and religious personnel “only in so far as the state of health, the
spiritual needs and the number of prisoners of war require.” 10 The Third
Geneva Convention stipulates that “[t]he Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment.” 11 Concerning civilians, the Fourth Geneva
Convention provides that—as to aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict—“[t]he internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it
absolutely necessary.” 12 In an occupied territory, “[i]f the Occupying Power
considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety

9
Material for this section has been substantially based on text written by this author. See
Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-international Armed Conflict. 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437,
439–42 (2009); Marco Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment
of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 617–18
(2008).
10
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 28, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
First Geneva Convention]; see also id. arts. 30, 32; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
arts. 36–37, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention].
11
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 21, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention defines prisoner of war. Prisoners of war are not limited to
members of the armed force but also include, for example, “[p]ersons accompanying the
armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military
aircraft crews, war correspondents, and supply contractors.” Id. art. 4(A)(4) (emphasis
added).
12
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]
(emphasis added).
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measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to
assigned residence or to internment.” 13
In contrast, conventional IHL applicable to non-international armed
conflict provides no specific grounds for internment. Yet, conventional IHL
contemplates that internment occurs in non-international armed conflict, as
demonstrated by the references to internment found in Articles 5 and 6 of
the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 14 which regulate—to a certain extent—internment. Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions makes no reference to internment.
In order to explain the absence of a legal basis for internment in
IHL applicable to non-international armed conflict, a parallel will be drawn
to the issue of the legality of non-state actors taking up arms against the
state—that is, engaging in armed conflict. This is not a matter regulated by
IHL, but by domestic law, 15 and it is hard to imagine domestic legislation
doing anything but prohibiting such action. 16 Thus, while a non-state actor
by the mere fact of engaging in armed conflict violates domestic law, it does
not violate IHL. IHL addresses the reality that non-international armed conflict exists—and that internment will occur during it—“by regulating it to
ensure a minimum of humanity in this . . . illegal situation.” 17
In addition to providing guidance on when internment may occur or
begin, IHL applicable to international armed conflict also stipulates when
the captivity must end—further clarifying the boundaries of permissible
internment. Retention of medical and religious personnel must cease if prisoners of war are not in need. 18 According to the Third Geneva Convention,
repatriation of prisoners of war takes place due to medical reasons during
the conflict, 19 and release and repatriation for all, without delay, must occur
13

Id. art. 78 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 5, adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 (providing that “the following provisions shall be respected as
a minimum with regard to persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained . . . .”) [hereinafter Second Additional Protocol].
15
The use of force between states (international armed conflict) is a matter regulated by
international law, i.e., jus ad bellum (distinct from jus in bello).
16
This explains the incorporation of Article 6(5) into the Second Additional Protocol. See
Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 6(5) (stating that at the end of hostilities
authorities should grant broad amnesty to armed conflict participants and those deprived of
liberty in relation to the armed conflict). Without amnesty, non-state actors may be reluctant
to put down their arms because they likely violated domestic criminal law by their participation in hostilities.
17
MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., 1 HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 102–03 (2006).
18
See First Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 28; Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 10, art. 37.
19
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109–17.
14
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after the cessation of active hostilities. 20 Unlike prisoners of war (with no
medical reason requiring release), civilian internees may not necessarily be
interned until the end of the conflict. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides that a civilian must be released “as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist”; 21 this may be during the conflict. If,
however, civilians remain interned for the duration of the conflict,
“[i]nternment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.” 22
Captured combatants, simply because they are opposing combatants, are interned in order to prevent them from returning to the battlefield.
Except when doubt arises as to whether the person is entitled to prisoner-ofwar status, 23 there is no need for an individual review, as the internment is
not based on any particular individual characteristic but on mere formal
membership in the state’s armed forces (or formally accompanying the
armed forces) and would run counter to the IHL objective for interning of
prisoners of war. 24 As the reasoning behind the basis for internment of prisoners of war under IHL is unique, the reasoning does not extend to interned
civilians in an international armed conflict or persons interned in a noninternational armed conflict.
Thus, generally only the basis for interning a civilian requires an assessment, 25 as civilians—unlike combatants who are captured and become
prisoners of war—may only be interned if and for as long as they pose an
imperative security threat. The Fourth Geneva Convention applicable to
international armed conflicts provides internment review procedures applicable to civilian internees, giving some detail regarding the type of body
and timing of review. 26 The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions introduces an additional safeguard to the process. 27 Finally, it
20

Id. art. 118; But see id. art. 119(5).
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 132.
22
Id. art. 133.
23
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.
24
See Marco Sassòli, Le Droit International Humanitaire, Une Lex Specialis par Rapport
aux Droit Humains?, in LE DROITS DE L’HOMME ET LA CONSTITUTION, ETUDES EN
L’HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR GIORGIO MALINVERNI 375, 386–87 (2007). See SASSÒLI ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 154–55. See also Gloria Gaggioli and Robert Kolb, A Right to Life in
Armed Conflicts? The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights, 37 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 115, 122 (2007) (Thus, this “gap” in IHL is instead an intentional omission, a
“qualified silence”).
25
Reviews of medical reasons for the release of prisoners of war also take place. See Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109–17.
26
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 43, 78(2).
27
The person interned is to “be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the
reasons why these measures were taken.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
art. 75(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol].
21
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should be noted that unlawful confinement is a grave breach of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. 28
The Second Additional Protocol applicable in non-international
armed conflict briefly mentions internment 29 but provides no guidance regarding procedures either to assess the decision to intern or to terminate
captivity. Again, Common Article 3 does not speak to the issue.
B.

Internment of Civilians During International Armed Conflict: The
Meaning of “Imperative Reasons of Security”

A civilian may be interned based on an individual determination
that it is absolutely necessary for “imperative reasons of security”—rather
than on mere formal membership in the state’s armed forces as for prisoners
of war. Thus, understanding the meaning and scope of “imperative reasons
of security” is critical to appropriately applying IHL and ensuring no arbitrary deprivation of liberty takes place.
As the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) stated, “[t]he confinement of civilians during armed conflict may be
permissible in limited cases, but has in any event to be in compliance with
the provisions of . . . Geneva Convention IV.” 30 In that regard, it is crucial
to understand what is meant by the following language in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which stipulates the legal basis for internment: “if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary” 31 or, in occupied
territory, “imperative reasons of security”. 32
This legal basis requires that, for purposes of internment, persons
must represent a real threat to the state’s security in the present or in the
future. The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention explains “[i]t
did not seem possible to define the expression ‘security of the State’ in a
more concrete fashion. It is thus left very largely to Governments to decide
the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or external security of the
28

See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 147. See also Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(vii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 2(g), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M
1192.
29
The Second Additional Protocol only states that “[i]f it is decided to release persons
deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so
deciding.” Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art. 5(4). In the Second Additional
Protocol’s suggestion to grant amnesty for participation in hostilities, internment is mentioned: “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned
or detained.” Id. art. 6(5) (emphasis added).
30
3URVHFXWRUY'HODLü&DVH1R,7-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 578 (Nov. 16, 1998).
31
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 42 (emphasis added).
32
Id. art. 78 (emphasis added).
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State which justifies internment or assigned residence.” 33 The ICTY agrees
with the assertion that “the decision of whether a civilian constitutes a threat
to the security of the State is largely left to its discretion”; 34 however, this
does not mean that no parameters exist on this discretion.
In the 'HODOLü case, the ICTY found the accused guilty of unlawful
confinement of civilians—grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 35 The ICTY “interpreted Article 42 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention]
as permitting internment only if there are ‘serious and legitimate reasons’ to
think that the interned persons may seriously prejudice the security of the
detaining power by means such as sabotage or espionage.” 36 The ICTY Trial Chamber held:
Clearly, internment is only permitted when absolutely necessary. Subversive activity carried on inside the territory of a party to the conflict, or actions which are of direct assistance to an opposing party, may threaten the
security of the former, which may, therefore, intern people or place them
in assigned residence if it has serious and legitimate reasons to think that
they may seriously prejudice its security by means such as sabotage or
espionage.
On the other hand, the mere fact that a person is a national of, or aligned
with, an enemy party cannot be considered as threatening the security of
the opposing party where he is living and is not, therefore, a valid reason
for interning him or placing him in assigned residence. To justify recourse
to such measures, the party must have good reason to think that the person
concerned, by his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real
threat to its present or future security. 37

The Trial Chamber also stated:
The judicial or administrative body reviewing the decision of a party to a
conflict to detain an individual must bear in mind that such measures of
detention should only be taken if absolutely necessary for reasons of security. Thus, if these measures were inspired by other considerations, the re33

4 COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 257 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) (regarding Article 42); see also id. at
368 (regarding Article 78 and reiterating that “[i]n any case, such measures can only be
ordered for real and imperative reasons of security; their exceptional character must be preserved.”) [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
34
3URVHFXWRUY'HODLü&DVH1R,7-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 583 (Nov. 16, 1998). See also
3URVHFXWRUY.RUGLü&DVH1R,7-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 282–85 (Feb.26, 2001).
35
6HH'HODOLü, IT-96-21-T, at Part IV.
36
1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 345 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts &
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (citing 'HODOLü, IT-96-21-T, ¶ 576). See also id. ¶ 582
(referencing Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva, applicable to occupied territory, as also safeguarding the rights of interned persons).
37
ProVHFXWRUY'HODLü&DVH1R,7-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 576–77 (Nov. 16, 1998) (emphasis in original).
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viewing body would be bound to vacate them. Clearly, the procedures established in Geneva Convention IV itself are a minimum and the fundamental consideration must be that no civilian should be kept in assigned
residence or in an internment camp for a longer time than the security of
the detaining party absolutely demands. 38

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 39 and the
ICTY agree that “it must be borne in mind that the measure of internment
for reasons of security is an exceptional one and can never be taken on a
collective basis”, 40 i.e., that there must be an individual nexus. 41 The ICRC
asserts “that internment . . . for the sole purpose of intelligence gathering,
without the person involved otherwise presenting a real threat to State security, cannot be justified.” 42 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees; a plurality of
the Court interpreted the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) as implicitly including the power to detain, under certain circumstances, al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan. However,
the Court noted that “[c]ertainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the
purpose of interrogation is not authorized.” 43 The ICRC also points out that
38

Id. ¶ 581.
ICRC institutional guidelines: “Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence”,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED
CONFLICTS 11, 30IC/07/8.4 (Oct. 2007), Annex 1 (originally published as Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 381 (2005), available
at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-858-p375/$File/irrc_858_Pejic.
pdf) [hereinafter ICRC Guidelines].
40
Prosecutor v. Delaiü&DVH1R,7-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 583 (Nov. 16, 1998). See also
3URVHFXWRUY.RUGLü&DVH1R,7-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 285 (Feb.26, 2001).
41
See COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 367 (regarding Article 78 and stating that “there
can be no question of taking collective measures: each case must be decided separately”).
42
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 380.
43
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality). See Matthew Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L &
POL’Y 1, 15–16 (2009) (citations omitted):
[N]o doubt information-gathering was at the forefront of the Bush administration’s
detention policies, as demonstrated by the lengths to which that Administration
went to defend permissive interrogation standards and CIA detention programs.
“These are dangerous men with unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks
and their plans for new attacks,” explained President Bush in September 2006, in
disclosing publicly the CIA secret detention program. “The security of our nation
and the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what those terrorists
know.”
Id. at 16 (citing President George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/. See also Remarks by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey,
39
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“interning or administratively detaining persons for the purpose of using
them as ‘bargaining chips’ is also not justifiable as a reason for internment.
Such deprivation of liberty would in fact amount to hostage-taking, which is
prohibited.” 44
“Subversive activity carried on inside the territory of a Party to the
conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enemy Power” 45
meets the threshold of “imperative reasons of security”. 46 Providing logistical support, analogous to that described in the Third Geneva Convention47
for persons “accompanying” the armed forces rather than being part of
them, can be considered direct assistance. Merely having political sympathy
or political affiliation with the enemy cannot constitute “imperative reasons
of security” for internment purposes.
Furthermore, given the discussion below on U.S. internment standards, it is important to emphasize that this standard of “imperative reasons
of security” is distinct from that of “direct participation in hostilities.” 48
Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008) (“Detention often yields valuable intelligence about the intentions,
organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.”)). See also DEP’T OF ARMY,
COUNTERINSURGENCY (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and
often impossible. Treating a civilian like an insurgent, however, is a sure recipe for
failure. Individuals suspected of insurgent or terrorist activity may be detained for
two reasons:
x To prevent them from conducting further attacks.
x To gather information to prevent other insurgents and terrorists from conducting attacks.
These reasons allow for two classes of persons to be detained and interrogated:
x Persons who have engaged in, or assisted those who engage in, terrorist or
insurgent activities.
x Persons who have incidentally obtained knowledge regarding insurgent and
terrorist activity, but who are not guilty of associating with such groups.
People engaging in insurgent activities may be detained as enemies. Persons not
guilty of associating with insurgent or terrorist groups may be detained and questioned for specific information. However, since these people have not—by virtue
of their activities—represented a threat, they may be detained only long enough to
obtain the relevant information. Since persons in the second category have not engaged in criminal or insurgent activities, they must be released, even if they refuse
to provide information.
Id. ¶ 7-40.
44
ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 380 n.20.
45
See COMMENTARY, supra note 33, at 258 (regarding Article 42).
46
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 78.
47
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4).
48
See generally Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J.
INT’L L. 48 (2009) (addressing the improper conflation between the authority to target and
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First, these standards serve different purposes. The latter determines
whether a civilian loses his or her presumptive 49 immunity from attack and
may thus be directly targeted during that period 50 and the former determines
whether a civilian during an international armed conflict may be interned.
Second, their scopes of coverage differ. While the standard of “direct participation in hostilities” can—in rough terms—be considered an authorization to kill, the standard of “imperative reasons of security” merely initiates
a temporary deprivation of a person’s liberty; the latter standard is broader
in scope. There is overlap only in that a civilian “directly participating in
hostilities” would certainly meet the standard of “imperative reasons of security” for purposes of internment; the reverse is not automatically true.

the authority to intern, particularly the distinction between civilians “directly participating in
hostilities” and civilians not having done so but yet posing an imperative security threat).
49
“In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.” First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 50(1).
50
Despite mention of the standard of “direct participation in hostilities” in IHL treaty law,
applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts, no definition of it exists in
treaty law, state practice, or jurisprudence. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 10,
art. 3 (also known as “Common Article 3”); Second Additional Protocol, supra note 14, art.
13; First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 51(3). The Israeli Supreme Court is the only
court to have addressed this notion in some detail. See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v.
Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02 (Dec. 14, 2006). Lack of criteria to distinguish between peaceful
civilians who cannot be directly attacked and civilians “directly participating in hostilities”
who may be attacked for such time as that they directly participate in hostilities led the ICRC
to engage a process, involving experts, to clarify the notion of “direct participation in hostilities” under IHL. The importance of this clarification has dramatically increased in parallel
with the growing involvement of civilians in the conduct of hostilities in both international
and non-international armed conflicts. The outcome of this process was released in the form
of “interpretative guidance” in mid-2009. NILS MELZER, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (May 2009), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/SODA-7TJP5H/
$file/ICRC_002_0990.pdf?openelement [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must meet the
following cumulative criteria: 1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively,
to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct
attack (threshold of harm), and 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act
and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 3. the
act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm
in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent
nexus).
Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
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What To Do During Non-International Armed Conflicts Where IHL
Provides No Basis for Internment? 51

In response to the fact that IHL of non-international armed conflict
(such as currently taking place in Afghanistan 52) only indicates that internment occurs in non-international conflicts but contains no indication of how
it is to be regulated, 53 the U.S. Administration and courts have applied IHL
of international armed conflict by analogy. How they have done so is discussed in more detail later. However, this section explains in general how
IHL of international armed conflict could be analogously applied to noninternational armed conflicts in order to address internment. The implications—both positive and negative—of doing so are also addressed.
As mentioned, the provisions regulating internment in international
armed conflict, unlike for non-international armed conflict, are set out according to protected person categories—for example, prisoners of war or
civilians. However, this does not prevent application of those provisions to
non-international armed conflict because “no fundamental difference between the regimes applicable to the two situations prohibits the application
of those same” provisions, as long as the rules are applied according to the
person’s function rather than status. 54 This is particularly relevant as the
status of combatants formally exists only in international armed conflicts. 55
Applied by analogy, IHL of international armed conflict would provide bases for internment. Thus, the standards of the Fourth Geneva Convention would apply to civilians and those of the Third Geneva Convention
to persons designated as “combatants”. 56 Whether fighters in a noninternational armed conflict can be analogized to “combatants” or remain
civilians, who may be targeted when directly participating in hostilities,
remains unsettled. 57 However, making the distinction between “combatants”
and civilians in non-international armed conflict would appear consistent
with current discussions by experts on the use of the “membership approach” to interpret “direct participation in hostilities” in such conflicts. 58
51

Material for this section has been substantially based on text written by this author in
Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 623–25.
52
See supra text accompany note 7.
53
See ICRC Guidelines, supra note 39, at 377.
54
“[T]he law of non-international armed conflict does not protect according to the status
of a person but according to his or her actual activities.” SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17, at
258.
55
“The main feature of [combatant] status in international armed conflicts is that they
have the right to directly participate in hostilities.” Id. at 149.
56
See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 352.
57
Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 607–08. See also ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE,
supra note 50, at 27–30.
58
See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 25.
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The “membership approach” considers an individual who fulfills a combat
function—a function requiring direct participation in hostilities—to be a
“member” of an armed group, such that that individual may be directly targeted until he or she disengages from that function or is placed hors de
combat. 59 This is analogous to being a “combatant” in an international
armed conflict. Applying this approach to internment, the “members” of an
armed group could be held on the same (analogous) basis as combatants
who are interned as prisoners of war in international armed conflict.
As analogous application does not confer combatant status, there
would still, for example, be no combatant immunity. The Geneva Conventions, while allowing for internment, would therefore not prevent the repression of acts prohibited by domestic law. Nor would application by analogy
of the Third Geneva Convention to members of armed forces and groups
entitle them to any review procedure; such procedural regulation could only
be found in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The question arises, however, as to whether the analogous application of the law of international armed conflicts sufficiently considers the
fundamental distinction between that law and the law of non-international
armed conflict—that is, that the rules applicable to international armed conflict generally 60 apply only to protected person categories, such as prisoners
of war or enemy civilians, and that no such categories exist in noninternational armed conflict. Even if the distinction in non-international
armed conflict could be made by function rather than status, on which criteria should the assessment of a civilian or “combatant” be based? Should
“combatants” be measured against the criteria in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention or Article 44 of the First Additional Protocol, or perhaps
through the “membership approach”? 61 Would Article 5-type tribunals62
need to be instituted in non-international armed conflicts to make the
determination?
If the Third Geneva Convention is applied by analogy, a participant
in hostilities could be detained without any individual periodic review for
the whole duration of the conflict. 63 However, it is much more difficult in
59
“Civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each specific act
amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas members of organized armed groups
belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict cease to be civilians . . . , and lose protection against direct attack, for as long as they assume their continuous combat function.” Id. at
70.
60
An exception is, for example, Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol. See First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 75.
61
See supra text accompanying note 59.
62
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.
63
For a standpoint rejecting such an analogy, see Comm’n on Human Rights, Situation of
Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, ¶ 24, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006).
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non-international conflicts than in international armed conflicts to determine
who is actually a fighter. 64 Such a determination must therefore be made on
an individual basis. It is also much harder to determine the actual end of
hostilities in a non-international armed conflict than in an international
armed conflict between states, which may conclude a ceasefire or surrender.
All this may support application, if at all, of the law of international armed
conflict to non-international armed conflict by analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention alone, as there are no combatants and hence no concomitant
prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore,
analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention could be founded on a determination of the lex specialis according to the overall systemic purposes of the
international legal order. 65 In a non-international armed conflict, analogy to
the Fourth Geneva Convention would avoid internment of persons without
review or possible release 66 for the duration of the conflict. Application of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, brings with it an internment standard—“imperative reasons of security”—that is broader in scope than that
for determining combatancy. 67
III. U.S. PRACTICE REGARDING INTERNMENT OF PERSONS HELD
AT GUANTÁNAMO
A.

U.S.-asserted Legal Bases for Internment

The Bush Administration based its authority to intern on Executive
power and the AUMF passed by Congress on September 18, 2001. 68 Congress passed the AUMF in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, authorizing the President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of internation-

64

See Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at 607–08, 613–16.
For a fuller discussion on lex specialis, see Olson, supra note 9, at 445–49; Sassòli &
Olson, supra note 9, at 603–04.
66
But see Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, arts. 109–17 (referring to repatriation
of prisoners of war during the conflict for medical reasons).
67
See id. art. 4; First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 44. See also ICRC
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 25 (the “membership approach” using direct
participation in hostilities).
68
“The Government argues that petitioners are lawfully detained because they are ‘enemy
combatants,’ who can be held pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and
the President’s powers as Commander in Chief.” Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191,
196 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008).
65
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al terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. 69

An AUMF must be distinguished from a declaration of war—of
which there have only been eleven. 70 In particular, the domestic law ramifications of an AUMF differ substantially from declarations of war. 71 The
language employed in AUMFs varies—each AUMF being drafted to the
contours of a specific situation. 72 The AUMF passed by Congress in 2001 is
quite broad. Unlike previous AUMFs, the 2001 AUMF authorizes the use of
military force not only against states connected to the September 11, 2001
attacks but also against organizations and persons. This extension to organizations and persons is unprecedented in U.S. history.73
While the full scope of the 2001 AUMF’s reach remains to be determined, it is clear that the Bush Administration interpreted this AUMF
broadly, “confirm[ing] the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief to
conduct antiterrorism operations anywhere in the world, including within
the United States.” 74 The Bush Administration has cited the AUMF as authorizing measures incident to “warfighting”, including internment. The
Administration also asserted authority to conduct electronic surveillance of

69
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept.
18, 2001).
70
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (March 8, 2007), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf. These eleven declarations of war encompassed five different
wars: The War of 1812 with Great Britain, the War with Mexico in 1846, the War with Spain
in 1898, the WWI, and WWII. Id. at 1–2.
71
Elsea’s and Grimmet’s report declares:
With respect to domestic law, a declaration of war automatically triggers many
standby statutory authorities conferring special powers on the President with respect to the military, foreign trade, transportation, communications, manufacturing,
alien enemies, etc. In contrast, no standby authorities appear to be triggered automatically by an authorization for the use of force. Most standby authorities do not
require a declaration of war to be actualized but can be triggered by a declaration
of national emergency or simply by the existence of a state of war. Declarations of
war and authorizations for the use of force waive the time limitations otherwise
applicable to the use of force imposed by the War Powers Resolution.
Id. at Summary. For a list of the statutes triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of
national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war, see id. at 45–76.
72
For the text of key AUMFs, see id. app. II.
73
Id. at 17.
74
Id. at 18.
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communications within the United States without following procedures laid
out in the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act. 75
While the Obama Administration has not asserted Executive power
for its authority to intern but rather said it would rely on authority already
provided by Congress through the AUMF, the Obama Administration continues to justify internment because of the existence of an armed conflict,
stating that the AUMF is to be “informed by principle of the laws of war.” 76
In fact, it appears that the Obama Administration follows the preceding
Administration’s view that the United States is involved in a “novel” type of
armed conflict. 77
The Obama Administration’s specific reference to the law of war in
interpreting the AUMF is a positive step in that it ensures application of
IHL, which was not always the case during the previous Administration. 78
However, if there is no armed conflict, the AUMF must not be informed by
IHL, but by other applicable law: international human rights law and domestic law.
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi determined that the use
of force authorized by the AUMF includes the authority to intern individuals who are a part of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the context of an armed
conflict:
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United
States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to
have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We
conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we
are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they
were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be

75
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa11906wp.pdf.
76
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1.
77
Id.
78
“I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of
the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere
throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party
to Geneva.” Memorandum from President George W. Bush to National Security Advisors,
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, ¶ 2(a) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. “I also accept the
legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the
relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed
conflict not of an international character.’” Id. at 2(c).
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an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President to use. 79

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Hamdi specifically focuses on armed
conflict:
In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use
specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant’s
return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of “necessary and appropriate force,” Congress has clearly and
unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered
here. 80

The Court did not address specifically whether the AUMF provides
the basis to intern “non-combatants” or whether the AUMF provides the
basis to intern in situations not rising to the level of armed conflict. These
issues remain to be explicitly addressed. However, following the Court’s
reasoning, the identical conclusion could be reached for “peacetime” operations, i.e., law enforcement operations: If detention “is so fundamental and
accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’”, 81 then certainly detention should also be similarly considered in law enforcement operations where permissible use of deadly force
is much more circumscribed than is its use by and against combatants in an
armed conflict.
District Court Judge Ellen Huvelle’s recent opinion indicated a limitation on the Executive’s authority to intern. She wrote “the AUMF,
which defines the Executive’s detention authority in plain and unambiguous
language, speaks only to the prevention of ‘future acts of international terrorism against the United States.’” 82 While prevention of future acts could
be interpreted quite broadly, Judge Huvelle points out that:
[The AUMF] does not authorize unlimited, unreviewable detention. Instead, the AUMF requires some nexus between the force (i.e., detention)
and its purpose (i.e., preventing individuals from rejoining the enemy to
commit hostile acts). Accordingly, the AUMF does not authorize detention
of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those individuals

79

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (emphasis added) (plurality).
Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
81
Id. at 518.
82
Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 8 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136 (emphasis
added) (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224 (Sept. 18, 2001)).
80
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from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize detention where its purpose can no longer be attained. 83

B.

The Initial U.S. Standard(s) for Internment: Creation of the “(Unlawful) Enemy Combatant” Category

This section looks at the internment standards employed by the
United States and compares them to the IHL internment standards, thus
providing the background necessary for discussion of the D.C. District
Court’s application of these standards that follows. First, the various definitions of “unlawful enemy combatant” employed under the Bush Administration are discussed. After which, the new standard provided by the Obama
Administration will be compared and contrasted to IHL internment standards as well as the Bush Administration’s definitions.
1.

U.S. definitions of “enemy combatant” and “unlawful enemy
combatant”

Through the use of the definitions “enemy combatant” and “unlawful enemy combatant”, the United States has created a category of persons
not found in IHL, resulting in unfortunate consequences for the protective
features of IHL. The Bush Administration 84 and Congress have over time
utilized various definitions of “enemy combatant”.
In Hamdi, the U.S. Government offered a definition of “enemy
combatant” that more closely tracked the “direct participation in hostilities”
standard than would subsequent definitions: “an individual who . . . was
‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States and its coalition
partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the

83

Basardh, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 8.
The Military Order in 2001 gave a first indication of whom the U.S. planned to intern:
[A]ny individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing that: (1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to
cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of
subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and (2) it is in the interest of the United States that
such individual be subject to this order.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, at 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
84
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United States’ there.” 85 As mentioned above, the standard of “direct participation in hostilities” in IHL is not an internment standard; rather, it determines when a civilian loses his or her protection against direct attack. 86
After Hamdi, the Order Establishing the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) broadened the definition of “enemy combatant”. The
Order provided that an “enemy combatant” is:
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces,
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces. 87

According to this definition, anyone who merely supports the Taliban or al-Qaeda is deemed a “combatant”. However, mere support of the
war effort does not constitute combatancy. 88 The concern with this standard
85
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Brief for the
Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.
org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/03-6696Resp.pdf).
86
See supra text accompanying notes 48–50 (regarding direct participation in hostilities)
and 56–59 (regarding analogous application).
87
Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, at 1 (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter July 7 Memo].
88
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance provides:
The treaty terminology of taking a “direct” part in hostilities, which describes civilian conduct entailing loss of protection against direct attack, implies that there can
also be “indirect” participation in hostilities, which does not lead to such loss of
protection. Indeed, the distinction between a person’s direct and indirect participation in hostilities corresponds, at the collective level of the opposing parties to
an armed conflict, to that between the conduct of hostilities and other activities that
are part of the general war effort or may be characterized as war-sustaining
activities.
Generally speaking, beyond the actual conduct of hostilities, the general war effort
could be said to include all activities objectively contributing to the military defeat
of the adversary (e.g. design, production and shipment of weapons and military
equipment, construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and
other infrastructure outside the context of concrete military operations), while warsustaining activities would additionally include political, economic or media activities supporting the general war effort (e.g. political propaganda, financial transactions, production of agricultural or non-military industrial goods).
Admittedly, both the general war effort and war-sustaining activities may ultimately result in harm reaching the threshold required for a qualification as direct participation in hostilities. Some of these activities may even be indispensable to harming the adversary, such as providing finances, food and shelter to the armed forces
and producing weapons and ammunition. However, unlike the conduct of hostilities, which is designed to cause—i.e. bring about the materialization of—the re-
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is that it establishes “guilt” by association, that is simply being a group
member—regardless of one’s contribution—makes one an “enemy
combatant”.
Through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress
endorsed the Administration’s CSRT definition, 89 as well as added a definition of “unlawful enemy combatant”. Some differences exist between these
definitions. The MCA defines “unlawful enemy combatant” as follows:
[A] person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or a person who . . . has been
determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status
Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense. 90

Like the CSRT definition, this definition includes as “combatants”
persons who have only supported, but not directly participated in hostilities.
However, the MCA definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” may be
somewhat narrower than the CSRT definition of “enemy combatant”. For
example, the U.S. Government had acknowledged that the CSRT definition
of “enemy combatant” might include a “little old lady in Switzerland” sending money to support a charity which, unbeknownst to her, turned out to be
a front for al-Qaeda. 91 Such a person would appear to fall outside the MCA
definition, as the person must have “purposefully and materially supported
hostilities.” 92 Nevertheless, even the inclusion of “hostilities” in relation to
“support” does not prevent this definition from being applied over broadly—possibly extending outside the scope of armed conflict.
2.

Why the “category” of “(unlawful) enemy combatant” is
problematic from an IHL perspective

As discussed above, the rules of IHL of non-international armed
conflict are less elaborate than those applicable to international armed conflict. Thus, it may be appropriate to analogize to IHL of international armed

quired harm, the general war effort and war sustaining activities also include activities that merely maintain or build up the capacity to cause such harm.
ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 51–52 (citations omitted).
89
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(ii) (2006).
90
Id. § 948a(1)(i).
91
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005). The
Government backed off this extreme view. See Al Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 226
(4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring).
92
See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(i) (2006).
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conflict. 93 Here, with respect to internment, analogy to the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions or only to the Fourth Geneva Convention could be
appropriate. It would be inappropriate, however, given the ramifications, to
analogize merely to the Third Geneva Convention, if such analogy merges
“fighters” and “civilians” into that single category. This, however, is what
the U.S. “(unlawful) enemy combatant” category effectively does. 94
The U.S. category inappropriately merges the concept of “combatants” and civilians who pose an imperative threat to security because the
definition of “enemy combatant” is broader than the corresponding definition of prisoner of war found in the Third Geneva Convention. 95 The U.S.
category adds elements of the “imperative-reasons-of-security” standard for
interning civilians during international armed conflict with some elements
possibly even sweeping broader than that standard. 96 This designation of
“enemy combatant” is particularly dangerous for the protection of persons
in armed conflict as it confuses the authority to intern with the authority to
kill. In creation of this designation, it appears that the United States has analogized solely to the Third Geneva Convention—and expanded its personal
scope of application. Thus, if a person is determined to be an “enemy combatant” this would not only mean that the person may be interned as a prisoner of war for the duration of hostilities without periodic review, but may
also be directly targeted as a combatant (and tried by a military court 97 as
demonstrated by the MCA 98).
93

See supra text accompanying notes 51–67.
The statements coming from the Government referred simply to combatants.
Because the United States [is] in an armed conflict with al Qaida and the Taliban, it
[is] proper for the United States and its allies to detain individuals who [are] fighting in that conflict. One of the most basic precepts in the law of armed conflict is
that states may detain enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities.
John B. Bellinger, Address at the London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on
Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm.
95
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4. Article 44 of the First Additional
Protocol is not referenced here as the United States is not a party to that treaty and that article’s content is not generally considered customary. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 36, at 387–89; Jean Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US Comments, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 473, 481
(2007). See also SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17, at 149–50 (providing an outline of who is a
combatant).
96
Its application also extends potentially beyond association with any armed conflict to
police enforcement operations.
97
The Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war are to be tried by “the same
courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power . . . .” Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 102. See also id. art.
84.
98
It has been asserted that the definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” in the MCA is
solely for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction for the military commissions.
94
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This new definition of “enemy combatant” also affects the treatment to which individuals are entitled once captured. The incorporation of
the notion of “unlawful enemy combatant” in, for example, the revised Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations, FM 2-22.3
(FM 34-52) confusingly overlaps with other “protected person categories.” 99 According to the Field Manual, only “unlawful enemy combatants”
may be subjected to the restricted interrogation technique of “separation”. 100
Finally, application of such a category to members of terrorist organizations that generally attempt to hide their identities and blend into the
civilian population will be extremely difficult. This raises the chances
of misidentifying an individual as an “enemy combatant” with all its
ramifications. 101
C.

The Obama Administration’s Internment Standard for Those Held
at Guantánamo: Denouncing the “Enemy Combatant” Category?

While the new Administration has abandoned the term “enemy
combatant”, it remains to be seen whether it has actually abandoned the
category. The specific purpose for the definition provided in the Government’s memorandum filed on March 13, 2009 102 may indicate that criticism
that the Administration’s definition is “really a case of old wine in new bottles” 103 is premature.
However, other sections of the MCA regarding detention refer to the statute’s definition. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). See also Goodman, supra note 48, at 61 n.68.
99
The Army Field Manual states:
Unlawful enemy combatants: Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled
to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict.
For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term “unlawful enemy combatant” is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3
(FM 34-52), ¶ 6-18 (2006), available at http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/
pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf. See also id. ¶ 6-19 (making a further distinction between an “unlawful
enemy combatant” or an individual “associated with or supporting the unlawful enemy combatants”). This field manual on interrogation replaces the 1992 field manual, and this revised
version was publicly released on September 6, 2006.
100
See id. app. M.
101
See supra text accompanying notes 60–65. See also Sassòli & Olson, supra note 9, at
606–10.
102
“[T]he Government is refining its position with respect to its authority to detain those
persons who are now being held at Guantanamo Bay.” March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1
(emphasis added).
103
Press Release, Ctr. For Constitutional Rights, Obama Administration Offers Essentially
Same Definition of Enemy Combatant Without Using the Term (Mar. 13, 2009), available at
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The Government pointed out in its memorandum that it is “refining
its position with respect to its authority to detain those persons who are now
being held at Guantánamo Bay”, 104 not “to define the contours of authority
for military operations generally, or detention in other contexts.” 105 Thus,
this is an internment standard, not a targeting standard nor a determination
of personal jurisdiction for use of military tribunals. If use of this definition
remains limited solely as an internment standard, many of the concerns related to the “enemy combatant” category discussed above do not arise. If it
does not, the refinements made to the definition are insufficient to alleviate
those concerns.
As development of a comprehensive detention policy, which may
introduce further changes, is underway at the time of this writing, 106 the
focus here must be on what can be evaluated at this time—whether this new
definition in the March 13 memorandum comports with the requirements of
IHL as relates to internment. Prior to doing so, however, it must be repeated
that, if no armed conflict exists, the Government’s basis for its authority to
intern (i.e., the AUMF) should not be “necessarily informed by the principles of the laws of war.” 107 Rather, the AUMF would need to be informed
by relevant international human rights law and domestic law.
The March 13 memorandum provides the following definitional
framework for review of the habeas petitions:
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a

http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/obama-administration-offers-essentiallysame-definition-enemy-combatant-with.
104
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 2.
106
See Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009); Executive Order; Declaration of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation,
¶¶ 3, 11 (March 13, 2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090313-LS-agdeclaration.pdf. See Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann and Col. Mark Martins to the Attorney General and Secretary of Defense Regarding the Preliminary Report of the Detention
Policy Task Force (July 20, 2009), available at http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/
Preliminary_Report_Detention_Policy_Task_Force.pdf.
107
See March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality).
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belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy
armed forces. 108

The March 13 memorandum makes clear that the U.S. Government analogizes to IHL, particularly “from traditional international armed conflicts.” 109
The Government’s preference for the Third Geneva Convention over the
Fourth Geneva Convention becomes evident in its response to the petitioner’s assertion that the U.S. authority to intern is limited to those “directly
participating in hostilities”. 110 The Government is correct that its authority
to intern under IHL applicable to international armed conflict is broader
(even as under the Third Geneva Convention with regard to those accompanying the armed forces 111) and the Government could simply have referred
by analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention. 112 Instead, the March 13 memorandum refers to the “law-of-war principle of military necessity” 113 and
the language of Common Article 3 and Articles 1(1) and 13 of the Second
Additional Protocol, which reference “armed groups”. 114
It must be recalled that Common Article 3 and Articles 1(1) and 13
of the Second Additional Protocol apply to non-international armed conflict
in which a non-State actor is a party to the conflict, hence the reference to
“armed groups”. 115 The Government’s reference to these provisions focusing on “armed groups” seems unnecessary and confusing and would seem to
indicate that the United States believes it may only intern members of a
fighting force, albeit it would consider such a fighting force to be defined
more broadly than those persons covered by Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention, i.e., those entitled to prisoner-of-war status. 116 If that is the
correct reading of the U.S. position, the March 13 memorandum’s analysis
raises a red flag that concerns could arise similar to those regarding the
“enemy combatant” category, particularly if the definitional framework is
applied beyond the purposes stated in the memorandum, e.g., for targeting
purposes and not merely internment.
In analyzing whether the above definitional framework is consistent
with IHL standards for internment, its two sentences will be addressed separately. The first sentence of the March 13 memorandum states:
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 8, 9.
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4).
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 42, 78.
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8–9.
See id. (discussing Common Article 3 and the Second Additional Protocol).
Id.
Id. at 8.
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The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. 117

This sentence, while appearing to track the language of the AUMF, omits an
important clause—a clause limiting the Executive’s authority to intern. That
clause from the AUMF is the following: “in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” 118 By its plain language, the AUMF does not permit the
use of force against these specific persons unless it is to prevent future terrorist acts. Criminal law enforcement is the appropriate means for addressing criminal acts that have been committed.
IHL may only inform this internment standard if armed conflict occurred and continued after September 11, 2001 such that IHL applies. The
U.S. Government considers that an armed conflict did continue, but others
consider that, if an armed conflict took place on September 11, 2001, 119 that
particular conflict ended with the later conflict in Afghanistan being a separate conflict (Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in October 2001).
If the conflict (began and) ended on September 11, 2001, IHL (even if applied by analogy) provides no basis for internment of persons after that date,
and IHL requires release of those interned in relation to the September 11,
2001 conflict unless the persons are held on criminal charges for violations
of the laws of war, such as war crimes.
Assuming that the armed conflict was ongoing from September 11,
2001 such that IHL continued to apply to those captured after that date, it
must be recalled from the discussion above that the only bases for internment would be if a person is a member of the fighting force (an analogy to
the Third Geneva Convention) or if reasons of security make it imperative
to do so (an analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Past acts alone do
not meet either standard. Thus, while a person who “planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001” 120 may certainly be held on criminal charges, he or she may only be
captured and interned (under IHL) after September 11, 2001 if he or she
continues to be a member of the fighting force or continues to pose an imperative security threat in the present or in the future.
The second sentence of the March 13 memorandum states that:
117

Id. at 2.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept.
18, 2001) (emphasis added).
119
That is, if an armed conflict occurred, rather than a horrific criminal act.
120
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept.
18, 2001).
118
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The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has
directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces. 121

As just mentioned, according to IHL a person may be interned if that person
is a member of the fighting force (an analogy to the Third Geneva Convention) or if that person poses an imperative security threat in the present or in
the future (an analogy to the Fourth Geneva Convention). Preventive security detention is forward looking. Past acts alone may be the basis for criminal charges but alone are insufficient for internment. Hence the definitional
framework’s use of the past tense, for example, “were part of”, “has committed”, or “supported”, could be cause for concern. However, the choice of
past tense language may merely reflect the fact that the habeas review provided by the Supreme Court in Boumediene has, until recently, 122 been understood by the D.C. District Court to be a limited review of only the initial
determination for internment; 123 hence, the review is backward looking. The
court is reviewing whether the initial decision to intern was valid, not
whether the continued internment is justified (as required for civilian internees under the Fourth Geneva Convention).
Turning to the specific language of the second sentence of the definitional framework, the new definition requires a demonstration of “substantial” support of Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces engaged
in hostilities against the United States and its collation partners, while the
CSRT definition of “enemy combatant” required only “support” of those
forces. Clearly, the new definition mandates passing a higher threshold than
the CSRT definition to justify internment. However, it is not clear whether
the new definition is better than the MCA definition of “unlawful enemy
combatant”, which focused on involvement in the hostilities (“purposefully
and materially supported hostilities”) rather than on how one supported a
particular group.

121

March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
See Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136. See also infra
text accompanying notes 147–57.
123
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). The Supreme Court mandated that
those interned at Guantánamo receive access to U.S. federal courts empowered to correct
errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to
detain.” Id. at 2269. The Court made clear that it was “not address[ing] the content of the law
that governs petitioners’ detention.” Id. at 2277. The Court also delegated to lower courts
resolution of procedural issues in relation to the habeas petitions. Id. at 2276.
122
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Furthermore, the significance of the additional word “substantial”
was left unclear by the Government, as it refrained from defining it in its
memorandum:
It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the
abstract, the precise nature and degree of “substantial support,” or the precise characteristics of “associated forces,” that are or would be sufficient to
bring persons and organizations within the foregoing framework. Although
the concept of “substantial support,” for example, does not justify the detention at Guantanamo Bay of those who provide unwitting or insignificant support to the organizations identified in the AUMF, and the Government is not asserting that it can detain anyone at Guantanamo on such
grounds, the particular facts and circumstances justifying detention will
vary from case to case, and may require the identification and analysis of
various analogues from traditional international armed conflicts. Accordingly, the contours of the “substantial support” and “associated forces”
bases of detention will need to be further developed in their application to
124
concrete facts in individual cases.

This new standard—as with the former—still includes individuals who were
“part of . . . Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Thus, it
appears that membership alone is grounds for internment. Depending upon
how being “part of” is understood, this standard could be very broad indeed.
A person who is sympathetic to the objectives of al-Qaeda and carries a
membership card could meet this definition. Such a standard is broader than
that foreseen by either the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions. That “associated forces” is modified by reference to engagement in hostilities—
language usually reserved for armed conflicts—should help to restrain application only to situations rising to the level of armed conflict. 125 Also the
March 13 Memorandum mentions that being “part of” may depend on a
“formal or functional analysis of the individual’s role.” 126 This too indicates
that membership may not be defined (or applied) too broadly, as it is similar
to the “membership approach” taken in determining who permanently directly participates in hostilities. 127
The U.S. Government has indicated that this definitional framework
may evolve as the executive branch develops its comprehensive detention
policy. 128 And, the Executive Order specifically concerning disposition of
124

March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
But see Exec. Order No. 13,493, supra note 106, at 4901 (mentioning “in connection
with armed conflict and counter-terrorism operations” (emphasis added)).
126
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 6.
127
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
128
See March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,493, supra
note 106; Declaration of Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 106.
125
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those interned at Guantánamo makes explicit reference to consideration of
the “interests of justice” 129 in such determinations. While that is positive,
ensuring that a standard of internment does not sweep too broadly should
not rest on such discretion alone.
IV. HABEAS REVIEW OF DETENTION AT GUANTÁNAMO: THE D.C.
DISTRICT COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERNMENT STANDARDS
As of this writing, the D.C. District Court has ruled on thirty-five
petitions under both the Bush and Obama Administrations. 130 In twentynine of those cases, the judges have decided that the Government has failed
to establish “by a preponderance of the evidence” 131 that it had justification
in holding those individuals and thus, ordered their release. 132
This section reviews some of these cases in order to assess whether
the D.C. District Court’s decisions are consistent with IHL internment standards. This analysis will look to see whether application of the Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant” or the new definition provided by the Obama Administration extend, in particular, beyond the Fourth
Geneva Convention standard of “imperative reasons of security”, as this
standard is broader in scope than that found in the Third Geneva Convention. If this is the case, then individuals are not being held in compliance
with IHL. In addition, this analysis will look at whether the court applies the
Government’s standards more restrictively than IHL permits. If that is so,
the bases for this determination will be examined. It is one thing for the
Government to apply a detention standard more narrowly than permitted
under IHL, as no detaining authority is required to hold all individuals for
which IHL authorizes internment. It is quite a different thing for the court to
interpret the IHL internment standards more narrowly than traditionally
understood. An overly narrow interpretation could significantly impact
“warfighting” and the protective aims of IHL. 133
This review remains limited to the court’s interpretation of the internment standards, including the factors that the court considers meet the
129

Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). See also Exec. Order No.
13,493, supra note 106, at 4901.
130
Rosenberg, supra note 3. See also supra note 3.
131
See, e.g, Case Management Order at 3, Boumediene v. Bush, Civil Action No. 04-CV1166 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008).
132
See Rosenberg, supra note 3.
133
Narrowing the scope of whom IHL permits to be interned shifts the balance of interests
at stake. The purpose of internment is not to punish, but only to hinder the individuals’ direct
involvement in the armed conflict and/or to protect them. “The protection by [IHL] constitutes a compromise between the interest of the detaining power, the interest of the power on
which the prisoner depends, and the prisoner’s own interests.” SASSÒLI ET AL., supra note 17,
at 155.
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standards. This section does not analyze either the court’s procedures or
how the court assesses the evidence. 134 Of course, even this limited review
is hampered by the fact that much of the information on which the decisions
are based remains classified and is either excluded or redacted from the
judgments. Despite this hindrance, a few observations can be made.
A.

What Is Being Reviewed?

Until mid-March 2009, 135 all judges employed the Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant”. 136 In reviewing the habeas petitions, all judges of the D.C. District Court, with the exception of Judge Huvelle, 137 have not been providing a periodic review as to whether there exist
factors that justified the internee’s continued internment, as required, for
example, by the Fourth Geneva Convention with respect to the internment
of civilians in an international armed conflict. Rather, most judges are reviewing whether the initial decision to intern the individual was correct,
134

See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting a presumption of accuracy for the Government’s evidence and holding that “the accuracy of much of
the factual material contained in [the Government’s] exhibits is hotly contested for a host of
different reasons . . . ,” but employing “the mosaic theory” rather than proving directly that
the internee was a terrorist); Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C.
Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/AlAdahi-opinion-8-21-09.pdf (memorandum decision discussing the “mosaic theory” and
circumstantial evidence); Bostan v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-883 (RBW), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73583 *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009) (memorandum decision addressing relatively strictly the admissibility of hearsay); Kahn v. Obama, Civil Action No. 08-1101 (JDB), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73025 *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2009) (memorandum decision addressing how
judges should address evidence in the form of intelligence reports).
135
Judge Bates did not follow Judge Leon’s employment of the Bush Administration’s
definition of “enemy combatant”. Instead, he requested clarification from the Obama Administration. See supra text accompanying notes 102–134 (regarding the Obama Administration’s response in its March 13 filing).
136
On October 23, 2008, the court heard oral arguments from the parties regarding the
appropriate definition of “enemy combatant” to be employed in these hearings. Boumediene
v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2008). Four days later, the court issued a
Memorandum Order adopting the definition which had been drafted by the Department of
Defense in 2004 for the type of Combatant Status Review Tribunal proceedings that these
detainees were given. Id. at 135. The following definition of “enemy combatant” governs the
proceedings:
An “enemy combatant” is an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or
al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed
a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
Id.
137
See Basardh v. Obama, No. 05-889 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), available at
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136. See infra notes 166–
75 and accompanying text.
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thus permitting internment until the end of hostilities. And, while “acknowledg[ing] the power of Judge Huvelle’s argument,” 138 Judge James Robertson declares that it “is not for me to decide. Combat operations in Afghanistan continue to this day and—in my view—the President’s ‘authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict’ which is ‘based on
longstanding law-of-war principles’ has yet to ‘unravel.’” 139
Judge Richard Leon explains “the question before this Court is
whether the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
each petitioner is being lawfully detained . . . .” 140 and thus may remain
interned. This type of review is more akin to an Article 5 Tribunal 141 used to
determine, when in doubt, whether someone in an international armed conflict is a prisoner of war and can be interned for the duration of hostilities.
However, as discussed above, the definition of “enemy combatant” does not
comport with the definition of “prisoner of war” found in the Third Geneva
Convention. 142 Judge Huvelle’s contrasting approach to review is discussed
in more detail below. 143
B.

Application of the Bush Administration’s “Enemy Combatant”
Standard

Despite the concerns raised above that the “enemy combatant”
standard sweeps more broadly than IHL standards, 144 Judge Leon—using
the Bush Administration’s definition 145—has granted writs of habeas, 146
which could indicate that this standard is being applied in practice in such a
way that it does not reach beyond the permissible bases to intern under IHL.
The following section provides a more in depth review to see if this is true.
138
Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75374 *1, *9
(D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009).
139
Id. at 8 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)).
140
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (employing the
“enemy combatant” definition). Judge Bates did not follow Judge Leon’s employment of the
Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant”. Instead, he requested clarification
from the Obama Administration. See infra text accompanying notes 198–221.
141
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.
142
Id. art. 4. For concerns regarding the over-inclusive nature of “enemy combatant”, see
supra text accompanying notes 93–101.
143
See infra text accompanying notes 168–177.
144
See supra text accompanying notes 93–101.
145
See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008).
146
See, e.g., id. (granting the petitions and ordering the release of Lakhdar Boumediene,
Mohamed Nechlas, Hadj Boudella, Mustafa Alt Idir, and Saber Lahmar); El Gharani v. Bush,
593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-1310
(RJL) (D.D.C. June 22, 2009), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/
detention/gitmo/janko_unclassified_release_order.pdf.

2009]

GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS REVIEW

227

In most of the cases in which Judge Leon denies the writ, he lists
multiple actions by the petitioner to demonstrate that the petitioner was
“part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces” and, thus, an “enemy
combatant”. For example, in Sliti v. Bush, 147 Judge Leon found it “more
probable than not that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan as an al Qaeda
recruit and trained at the local military training camp . . . .” 148 He based his
conclusion on evidence that the petitioner had traveled to Afghanistan with
financial support from extremists with ties to al-Qaeda, spent time during
the trip with close associates of al-Qaeda, stayed free of charge at a guesthouse in Afghanistan frequented by individuals with close ties to terrorist
organizations, and admitted knowledge of the location of the local al-Qaeda
military camp and its code words. 149 Judge Leon has indicated that he considers that “facilitating the travel of others to join the fight against the United States in Afghanistan constitutes direct support to al-Qaida . . . .” 150
However, under IHL simply facilitating travel does not make one a combatant, but, depending upon the directness of the involvement, could demonstrate the necessity for “imperative reasons of security” to intern the individual. It remains to be seen which other specific, single acts Judge Leon
will consider as the minimum for “support”. In other words, which one act
will be found sufficient in and of itself to establish an individual as an
“enemy combatant”? Will this “bottom line”, for example, stray below the
threshold set by the IHL standards if analogously applied to noninternational armed conflict?
Judge Leon, in denying the petition for writ, made clear in Al Alwi
v. Bush that “the Government does not need to prove [that the petitioner
actually took up arms against the United States or coalitional forces] in order for the petitioner to be classified as an enemy combatant . . . .” 151 IHL
also does not require such a showing for a civilian to be considered an imperative threat to security, nor necessarily to be a “combatant”, if, for example, the individual, not taking up arms directly, commanded operations.
Judge Leon also specified that “participation in a battle against U.S. and
allied forces would be . . . strong evidence of enemy combatancy”, 152 as
would be attendance at an al-Qaeda-affiliated training camp, acting as a
courier for certain senior al-Qaeda operatives, and membership in an alQaeda cell. 153 Also, under IHL these factors could be evidence of comba147
148
149
150
151
152
153

592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50–51.
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008).
Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2008) (emphasis in original).
El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 148 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009).
Id.
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tancy or at minimum an imperative threat to security. In a later case, Judge
Leon denied the writ, agreeing with the Government that the petitioner had
fought against U.S. and Afghan forces at the battle of Tora Bora,154 making
him an “enemy combatant” because he was “part of or supporting al Qaeda
or Taliban forces.” 155 The fact of taking up arms could justify internment
under IHL under either the Third Geneva Convention or, if he remained
a threat at the time of his capture or in the future, the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
Judge Leon’s denial of Al Bihani’s petition gained attention 156
when he wrote that:
[F]aithfully serving in an al Qaeda affiliated fighting unit that is directly
supporting the Taliban by helping to prepare the meals of its entire fighting force is more than sufficient “support” to meet this Court’s definition.
After all, as Napoleon himself was fond of pointing out: “an army marches
on its stomach.” 157

Such a statement raises concerns as to the extent that “war sustaining” efforts are going to be considered “support” by the D.C. District Court for
purposes of internment. Are farmers selling their crops to feed al-Qaeda
fighters or ammunition factory workers also “enemy combatants”? General
war sustaining efforts fail to meet the standard of internment for civilians
under the Fourth Geneva Convention (“imperative reasons of security”) and
certainly do not make one a “combatant”. 158
While Judge Leon’s particular statement gives pause, review of the
complete facts of this case may lessen concern. Taking a closer look at Al
Bihani v. Obama, it appears that Al Bihani was not merely a cook but was
also issued a weapon while serving under an al-Qaeda military commander. 159 Thus, it would appear that Al Bihani could be called to combat if
154

See Hammamy v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-429 (RJL) (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/2009-04-02%20Hedi%20Hammamy%20habeas%20denied.
pdf (memorandum order denying Hammamy’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). The writ
was denied based on an intelligence report that Hammamy’s papers were found after the
Battle of Tora Bora in the al-Qaeda cave complex, and Hammamy’s conduct in Italy, where
he was under investigation for involvement in an Islamic terrorist cell, just prior to his arrival
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Id. at 7–8. Despite this order being issued subsequent to the
Obama Administration’s announcement of a revised standard for the detention of individuals
at Guantanamo, Judge Leon held that the “definition of ‘enemy combatant’ previously
adopted by this Court in the Boumediene cases, governs the[se] proceedings.” Id. at 5.
155
Id. at 6.
156
See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, U.S. Can Continue Yemeni’s Detention, WASH. POST,
Jan. 29, 2009, at A4.
157
Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2009).
158
See supra text accompanying notes 31–50.
159
Al Bihani, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40.
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needed. This is analogous to a member of a State’s armed forces, who may
serve as a cook but is also trained for combat. Finally, it should be recalled
that the Third Geneva Convention permits the internment of civilians who
accompany the armed forces providing services; however, such individuals
are not combatants. 160
More recently, in Al Ginco v. Obama, 161 Judge Leon made clear
that even if it is established that an individual had been “part of” the Taliban
or al-Qaeda that does not make one an “enemy combatant” permanently.
Judge Leon looked at a variety of factors and determined, in granting the
petitioner’s writ, that the pre-existing relationship had sufficiently been
eroded over a sustained period of time 162 prior to Al Ginco’s internment by
the United States. 163 In so doing, Judge Leon implied that staying at a
guesthouse or going to a training camp alone or in combination are not necessarily sufficient factors to make one an “enemy combatant”: “[F]ive days
at a guesthouse in Kabul combined with eighteen days at a training camp
does not add up to a longstanding bond of brotherhood.” 164 This is consistent with an IHL analysis.
While Judge Leon, in granting Al Ginco’s petition, recognized that
a new standard had been presented by the Obama Administration, he did not
reach the question of whether to adopt the Government’s new definition in
this case because “[t]he Government’s theory of lawful detention here is not
based on ‘support’ to either the Taliban or al Qaeda, but rather petitioner’s
being ‘part of’ the Taliban or al Qaeda when he was taken into custody.”165
Other judges of the D.C. District Court have addressed the new standard

160

Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4). As such persons working closely
with the armed forces risked capture and should not be excluded from protection, they were
included in the Third Geneva Convention because their “position when captured had given
rise to difficulties during the Second World War.” 3 COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 64 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1958) (regarding Article 4(A)(4)).
161
Al Ginco v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-1310 (RJL) (D.D.C. June 22, 2009), available
at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/janko_unclassified_release_
order.pdf (memorandum order granting Al Ginco’s petition for writ of habeas corpus).
162
Id. at 10–12.
163
Judge Leon explains:
[C]ombining the limited and brief nature of Janko’s relationship with al Qaeda
(and/or the Taliban), with the extreme conduct by his captors over a prolonged period of time, the conclusion is inescapable that his preexisting relationship, such as
it was, was sufficiently vitiated that he was no longer “part of” al Qaeda (or the Taliban) at the time he was taken into custody . . . .
Id. at 12.
164
Id. at 11.
165
Id. at 6.
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presented by the Obama Administration. Those opinions are discussed
below.
C.

Interpreting the Obama Administration’s New Internment Standard

At the time of this writing, six decisions on petitions for habeas
corpus have been handed down based on this new standard. Five 166 have
been granted, and one denied. 167 Judge Huvelle, in her opinion of April 15,
2009 granting Basardh’s habeas petition, provided the first interpretation of
the new standard. She wrote that “the only issue before the Court is a narrow one—what, if any, relevance does Basardh’s [REDACTED] have to a
determination of the lawfulness of his continued detention?” 168 Judge Huvelle based her review on the lawfulness of Basardh’s continued detention—rather than the initial decision to detain—on the language of the
AUMF, as the Executive now rests its authority on the AUMF as “informed
by principle of the laws of war.” 169 She wrote: “The statutory language of
the AUMF, which defines the Executive’s detention authority in plain and
unambiguous terms, speaks only to the prevention of ‘future acts of international terrorism against the United States.’” 170
Thus, Judge Huvelle concluded that “the AUMF does not authorize
the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent those
individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize detention where its purpose can no longer be attained.” 171 She points
to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi as recognizing the Executive’s

166

See Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136; Bacha v.
Obama, Civil Action No. 05-2385 (ESH), 2009 WL 2365846 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009); Al
Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173 (D.D.C. July
29, 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. May 11, 2009); Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Adahi-opinion-8-21-09.pdf.
167
See Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009), available
at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/Mohammed_Ali_Awad_Trial
_Court_Decision.pdf. An additional petition was denied just as this article was submitted,
thus, it is not included in this analysis. See Al Odah v. United States, Civil Action No. 02828 (CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2009/08/Al-Odah-ruling-by-CKK-8-24-091.pdf.
168
Basardh, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 2–3 (emphasis added).
169
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 1 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521
(2004) (plurality)).
170
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (emphasis added in memorandum)).
171
March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 8.
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authority to “detain combatants for a limited purpose only”172—“to prevent
the captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up
arms again.” 173 In addition, Judge Huvelle pointed out that:
[T]his limitation on the Executive’s detention authority is consistent with
the administrative procedures that the government adopted in 2004 for the
CSRT and Administrative Review Board proceedings for determining
whether continued detention of a detainee is justified. In both sets of rules,
the government is obligated to perform ongoing threat assessments of detainees based upon the detainee’s current status. 174

Judge Huvelle’s approach to habeas review is analogous to the periodic
review required for civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 175 As of
this writing only Judge Huvelle has adopted this approach.
The primary factor in Judge Huvelle’s decision to grant Basardh’s
writ was that the petitioner’s cooperation while at Guantánamo—for which
he suffered physical attacks and credible death threats from other internees 176—was publicly known, thus severing any ties with the enemy and
foreclosing any risk that he could rejoin the enemy. Hence, Judge Huvelle
concluded “that the government has failed to meet its burden of establishing
that Basardh’s continued detention is authorized under the AUMF’s directive that such force be used ‘in order to prevent future acts of international
terrorism.’” 177 This result is consistent with that which should be reached if
the internment standard found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, pertaining
to civilians, were employed. Internment of such an individual could no
longer be deemed necessary “for imperative reasons of security”.
In late July 2009, Judge Huvelle granted another petition.178 As
Judge Huvelle’s opinion on this case is unavailable at the time of this writ172

Id.
Id. at 9 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518).
174
Id. at 9. See July 7 Memo, supra note 87, ¶ 13(i); Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, at enclosure 3 (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
175
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 43, 78(2).
176
Basardh v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-889 (ESH), at 4 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2008), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv0889-136.
177
Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
178
Bacha v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-2385 (ESH), 2009 WL 2365846 (D.D.C. July 30,
2009) (granting Bacha’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). This case received attention due
to Judge Huvelle’s expressed outrage at the flimsiness of Government’s case, based primarily on statements the petitioner made as a result of torture. See, e.g., William Glaberson, U.S.
Judge Challenges Evidence on a Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23gitmo.html?_r=1; Evan Perez & Jess Bravin, U.S.
Plans to Free an Afghan Detainee, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2009, at A6, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124892208846392665.html. See also Transcript of Hearing
173
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ing, it remains to be seen what further insight it may provide on the factors
she considers meet the Government’s new standard authorizing continued
detention.
Just a few days after Judge Huvelle’s decision in Basardh v.
Bush, 179 Judge Reggie Walton provided a detailed opinion on the Obama
Administration’s refined internment standard. 180 First, Judge Walton addressed whether the AUMF authorizes the detention of individuals in a noninternational armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda. He
determined that this issue must be addressed as he had concluded that IHL
applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts provides
no such authority. 181 When Judge Walton speaks of detention, he does not
speak to the IHL distinction between penal or disciplinary sanction (detention) versus preventive detention (internment); rather, he discusses battlefield capture. 182 In that regard, IHL provides no explicit authority to capture
combatants on the battlefield, in the same way that it does not explicitly
provide a right, but merely does not prohibit, killing combatants on the
battlefield.
Judge Walton concluded that authorization for detention must be
found elsewhere. 183 He concluded that the Supreme Court decisions in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 184 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 185 already determined that
the AUMF authorizes detention. 186 In Hamdi and Hamdan, the Supreme
Court respectively held that the AUMF extends to detention under the applicable IHL and that the United States is engaged in a non-international
armed conflict in Afghanistan. 187 No court has yet addressed whether the
AUMF authorizes preventive detention outside of armed conflict.
Before The Honorable Ellen Segal Huvelle, Bacha v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-2385
(ESH) (D.D.C. July 30, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2009/07/jawad-hearing-7-16-09.pdf.
179
Basardh v. Bush, Civil Action No. 05-cv-889 (ESH), 2009 WL 856345 (D.D.C. March
31, 2009) (final judgment granting Basardh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus).
180
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
181
See id. at 59–61.
182
See generally id.
183
See generally id. at 61.
184
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
185
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
186
See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
187
In relation to Afghanistan, the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held:
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.
But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations
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Having determined that the AUMF authorizes detention, Judge
Walton then addressed the standard for such detention. He correctly rejected
the petitioner’s argument that only persons who directly participate in hostilities can be detained. 188 He concluded that the detention standard is
broader.
First, he explained that the detention standard covers those persons
who are members of a fighting force that permanently directly participate in
hostilities. 189 In order to determine membership in the fighting forces of the
enemy, the court:
[A]gree[ed] with the government that the criteria set forth in Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention and Article 43 of the Additional Protocol
I[ 190] should inform the Court’s assessment as to whether an individual
qualifies as a member of the “armed forces” of an enemy organization like
al-Qaeda. 191

Judge Walton provided examples:
Thus, mere sympathy for or association with an enemy organization does
not render an individual a member of that enemy organization’s armed
forces. Instead, the individual must have some sort of “structured” role in
the “hierarchy” of the enemy force . . . . Sympathizers, propagandists, and
financiers who have no involvement with this “command structure,” while
perhaps members of the enemy organization in an abstract sense, cannot be
considered part of the enemy’s “armed forces” . . . . 192

Second, he considered the standard to also cover those persons who are not
analogous to combatants but are nevertheless part of the armed forces.
Judge Walton clarified:

against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan. . . . The United
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who “engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States.” If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved
in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of “necessary and appropriate force,” and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.
542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). And, in Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004), the Supreme Court confirmed the U.S. position that there existed an armed
conflict at that time, although the Court did not specify the type of armed conflict. Id. at 470.
But see supra text accompanying note 7.
188
Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 65–67.
189
See id. at 63–67. See discussion supra accompanying notes 58–61 (regarding the
“membership approach”).
190
The United States is not party to the First Additional Protocol.
191
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
192
Id. at 68–69.
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The key question is whether an individual “receive[s] and execute[s] orders” from the enemy force’s combat apparatus, not whether he is an alQaeda fighter. Thus, an al-Qaeda member tasked with housing, feeding, or
transporting al-Qaeda fighters could be detained as part of the enemy
armed forces notwithstanding his lack of involvement in the actual fighting itself, but an al-Qaeda doctor or cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda
fighter who shelters his son out of familial loyalty, could not be detained
assuming such individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of
command. 193

Judge Walton, in fact, analogized to those persons who are not combatants
and yet are still entitled to prisoner-of-war status, that is civilians formally
accompanying a State’s armed forces but are not members of it. 194 To this
limited extent then,
the Court conclude[d] as a matter of law that, in addition to the authority
conferred upon him by the plain language of the AUMF, the President has
the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, provided that the terms
“substantially supported” and “part of” are interpreted to encompass only individuals who were members of the enemy organization’s armed
forces, as that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their
capture. 195

The court’s understanding of the internment standard directly parallels Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. 196 No mention, however, is
made of the standard of internment contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention, 197 which is broader in scope but does not necessarily permit internment
until the end of hostilities. Judge Walton’s interpretation of the new deten-

193

Id. at 69 (alterations in original).
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, at 4(A)(4). IHL treaty provisions stipulate
that persons accompanying the armed forces, such as “supply contractors [and] members of
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces”, are not combatants, as medical and religious personnel are not. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11,
arts. 4(A)(4), 33. “Also excluded in the case of conflicts involving irregularly constituted
armed groups are ‘political and religious leaders . . . [and] financial contributors, informants,
collaborators and other service providers without fighting function [who] may support or
belong to an opposition movement or an insurgency as a whole, but can hardly be regarded
as members of its ‘armed forces’ in the functional sense underlying IHL.’” Goodman, supra
note 48, at 53, (citing NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (2008)).
195
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70–71 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
196
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4.
197
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 12, arts. 42, 78.
194
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tion standard is narrower than the previously applied “enemy combatant”
standard and probably narrower than the Obama Administration intended.
Originally, the Obama Administration submitted the Government’s
new position with respect to its authority to intern the individuals held at
Guantánamo Bay in response to an order from Judge John Bates.198 In Hamlily v. Obama, 199 Judge Bates reviewed the Government’s refinements.
Judge Bates accepted the Government’s authority to detain as stated in the
first sentence of the Government’s position. He wrote:
The first sentence of the government’s proposal is taken almost verbatim
from the AUMF itself and concerns the President’s authority to use force
against, and hence to detain under Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521, those individuals who (i) were responsible for the September 11 attacks or (ii) harbored
those who were responsible for the attacks. There is no debate that the
President has authority to detain such individuals. 200

Judge Bates, however, did not accept the Government’s framework in its
entirety. 201 He wrote that:
[The Court] rejects the concept of “substantial support” as an independent
basis for detention. . . . [and] finds that “directly support[ing] hostilities” is
not a proper basis for detention. In short, the Court can find no authority in
domestic law or the law of war, nor can the government point to any, to
justify the concept of “support” as a valid ground for detention. 202

As discussed above, application of the first sentence of the Government’s standard could be problematic under IHL. 203 The concerns previously raised 204 with regard to the second sentence, particularly the concern
of “substantial support” being defined over-broadly, are eliminated by
Judge Bates’s rejection of the concept of “substantial support,” with the
Government having provided very little justification for its inclusion. 205
198
See Hamlily v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-0763 (JDB) (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2009) (order
requesting the Government to submit any refinement of their position on the appropriate
definition of “enemy combatant”), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_
public_doc?2005cv2378-175.
199
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009).
200
Id. at 67 n.5.
201
Id. at 69.
202
Id.
203
See supra text accompanying notes 119–20.
204
See supra text accompanying notes 122–27.
205
See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009). The Hamlily
opinion states that:
After repeated attempts by the Court to elicit a more definitive justification for the
“substantial support” concept in the law of war, it became clear that the government has none. Nevertheless, the government asserted that “substantial support” is
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However, Judge Bates is wrong when he asserts that “directly supporting hostilities” could provide no basis for internment under IHL. Of
course, the validity of Judge Bates’s assertion depends upon how that
phrase is defined. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that an individual need
not “directly participate in hostilities” for internment to be authorized under
the Fourth Geneva Convention for “imperative reasons of security.” 206 For
example, providing intelligence to the enemy that seriously prejudices the
state’s security would constitute direct support justifying internment, as an
“imperative reason of security”. While the Government can always choose
to apply a more restrictive standard, it would be incorrect to declare that
under no circumstances does IHL provide authorization for such internment.
In determining that the Government has authority to intern “persons
who were part of . . . Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces”, 207
Judge Bates entered into a controversial area of IHL. On whether this governmental focus on “membership” in organizations responsible for the
September 11, 2001 attacks is consistent with IHL applicable to noninternational armed conflicts, which provides for no combatant status, Judge
Bates concluded that:
[T]he lack of combatant status in non-international armed conflicts does
not, by default, result in civilian status for all, even those who are members of enemy “organizations” like al Qaeda. Moreover, the Government’s
claimed authority to detain those who were “part of” those organizations is
entirely consistent with the law of war principles that govern noninternational armed conflicts. Common Article 3, by its very terms, contemplates the “detention” of “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their weapons
and those placed hor de combat,” . . . . At a minimum, this restriction establishes that States engaged in non-international armed conflict can detain
208
those who are “part of” enemy armed groups.

intended to cover those individuals “who are not technically part of al-Qaeda,” but
who have some meaningful connection to the organization by, for example, providing financing. . . . [A] detention authority that sweeps so broadly is simply beyond
what the law of war will support. The government’s approach in this respect evidences an importation of principles from the criminal law context.
Id.
206

See supra text accompanying notes 31–50. It should also be recalled that persons accompanying the armed forces without being combatants may be interned as prisoner of war.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(4).
207
See March 13 Memo, supra note 8, at 2.
208
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009) (citing Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 11, art. 3(1)). See also Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 52–53
(D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
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This issue, however, remains debated. 209 While Judge Bates determined that
this approach is consistent with IHL, he recognized that “the government’s
position cannot be said to reflect customary international law because, candidly, none exists on this issue.” 210
In addition, Judge Bates concluded that the authority to intern includes persons who were members of “associated forces”, which he interpreted to mean “‘co-belligerents’ as that term is understood under the law of
war.” 211 Judge Bates clarified that “‘[a]ssociated forces’ do not include terrorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or even a
common purpose with al Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the
current conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban.” 212 This interpretation should
assist in ensuring that application of the standard is not overbroad—limited
to those groups actively participating in hostilities—and, thus, in a manner
consistent with being a “party” to an armed conflict under IHL. 213
The critical question then remains as to how one determines being
“part of” an armed group. Judge Bates described his approach as functional
rather than formal. While he appears to be in agreement with Judge Walton’s conclusions in Gherebi v. Obama, 214 Judge Bates provides less
reasoning behind his delimitations. He did, however, list some nonexclusive factors—on their face not inconsistent with IHL—for making the
determination:
“[M]ere sympathy for or association with an enemy organization does not
render an individual a member” of that enemy organization. . . . The key
inquiry, then, is not necessarily whether one self-identifies as a member of
the organization (although this could be relevant in some cases), but
whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes
orders or directions. . . . Thus, as Gherebi observed, this could include an
individual “tasked with housing, feeding, or transporting al-Qaeda fighters
. . . but an al-Qaeda doctor or cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda fighter
who shelters his son out of familial loyalty, [is likely not detainable] as209

See supra text accompanying note 56.
Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (citing Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary
International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 190 (2005) (“[I]t is not clear
whether members of armed opposition groups are civilians who lose their protection from
attack when directly participating in hostilities or whether members of such groups are liable
to attack as such.”).
211
Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
212
Id. at 75 n.17.
213
See MELZER, supra note 194, at 248–50 (describing the quality of a “party” to an international armed conflict); id. at 254 (discussing how non-State actors qualify as a “party” to a
non-international armed conflict).
214
609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
210
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suming such individuals had no independent role in al-Qaeda’s chain of
command.” . . . Moreover, as the government conceded at oral argument,
its framework does not encompass those individuals who unwittingly become part of the al Qaeda apparatus—some level of knowledge or intent is
required. 215

Finally, Judge Bates agreed that the Government’s authority also
includes “any person who has committed a belligerent act”, but he understood this to be “any person who has directly participated in hostilities.”216
While the standard of “direct participation in hostilities” under conventional
IHL is used to assess when a civilian loses his or her protection against direct attack, 217 not his or her internment, it could, as discussed above, 218 be a
possible approach when analogizing to the Third Geneva Convention to
determine who is a “fighter” in non-international armed conflict. Judge
Bates acknowledged that the definition of “direct participation in hostilities”
is at present unsettled, not being defined in treaty law, 219 thus he identified
aspects of the standard that he considered settled and on which the court
would rely:
[L]ittle doubt exists that a civilian carrying out an attack would be directly
participating in hostilities. In the same vein, legal experts seem to agree
that civilians preparing or returning from combat are still considered to be
directly participating in hostilities, although the precise indication as to
when preparation begins and return ends remains controversial. 220

This is minimal guidance indeed. It remains to be seen how this standard
will be developed through the court’s application. As Judge Bates stated,
“further refinement of the concept of ‘direct participation’ will await examination of particular cases.” 221
Judges Walton’s and Bates’ interpretations of the internment standard differ in that Judge Walton did not reject outright, as did Judge Bates,
the “‘support’-based elements.” Nevertheless, there appears to be a certain
consistency between them, as “[w]ith the exception of these two ‘support’215

Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009) (citing Gherebi v.
Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68–69 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009).
216
Id. at 70, 77.
217
See First Additional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 51(3); Second Additional Protocol,
supra note 14, art. 13(3).
218
See supra text accompany notes 48–50.
219
See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 72 n.14 (citing Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report:
Direct Participation in Hostilities (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.
nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-report_res/$File/2005-09-report-dph-2005-icrc.pdf).
220
Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (citing Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report: Direct
Participation in Hostilities, supra note 219).
221
Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
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based elements, . . . [Judge Bates] adopt[ed] the government’s proposed
framework, largely for the reasons explained [by Judge Walton] in Gherebi.” 222 In particular, Judge Bates recognized that Judge Walton adopted the
Government’s framework subject to a comprehensive interpretation of that
standard. 223 Thus, these two approaches may not result in significant differences in practice, particularly as Judge Bates indicated that:
[W]hile the Court concludes that the concepts of “substantial support” and
“direct support” are not, under the law of war, independent bases for detention, evidence tending to demonstrate that a petitioner provided significant “support” is relevant in assessing whether he was “part of” a covered
organization (through membership or otherwise) or “committed a belligerent act” (through direct participation in hostilities). 224

In Mattan v. Obama, Judge Royce Lamberth adopted Judge Bates’
approach. 225 Also, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in Al Mutairi v. United
States 226 accepted the reasoning set forth in Judge Bates’ decision in Hamlily v. Obama, “partially adopt[ing] the Government’s proposed definition of
its detention authority.” 227 In applying that standard, Judge Kollar-Kotelly
granted the petitioner’s writ, deciding that:
[T]he Government has at best shown that some of Al Mutairi’s conduct
is consistent with persons who may become part of al Wafa or al Qaida,
but there is nothing in the record beyond speculation that Al Mutairi
222

Id. at 69.
Id. at 69 n.11.
224
Id. at 70.
225
See Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. May 21, 2009).
Accordingly, the Court will adopt respondents’ proposed definition except for the
two “support”-related elements described above. However, the Court will still consider support of Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated enemy forces in determining
whether a detainee should be considered “part of” those forces. Such consideration
of “support” factors is consistent with the Judge Bates’ opinion and, as Judge Bates
noted, is not inconsistent with Judge Walton’s opinion . . . as applied.
Id. at 26 (footnote omitted).
226
Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2009) (classified memorandum opinion
explaining decision to grant habeas to detainee), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/al_mutairi_unclassified_court_opinion.pdf.
227
Id. at 7–8 (footnote omitted). The memorandum opinion further states that:
The Court agrees that the President has the authority to detain individuals who are
“part of” the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated enemy forces, but rejects the Government’s definition insofar as it asserts the authority to detain individuals who only “substantially supported” enemy forces or who have “directly supported hostilities” in aid of enemy forces. While evidence of such support is undoubtedly probative of whether an individual is part of the enemy force, it may not by itself provide
the grounds for detention.
Id. at 8. See Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
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did, in fact, train with or otherwise become part of either or both
organizations. . . . 228

She considered that, “[i]n the context of this definition, the ‘key inquiry’ for
determining whether an individual has become ‘part of’ one or more of
these organizations is ‘whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he
receives and executes orders or directions.’” 229
Judge Robertson also adopted Judge Bates’ approach, in Awad v.
230
Obama. Unfortunately, as the opinion is so heavily redacted, it does not
provide much insight as to which factors met the internment standard, such
that the petitioner’s writ was denied. However, Judge Robertson indicated
that “it appears more likely than not that Awad was, for some period of
time, ‘part of’ al Qaida” 231 because:
At the very least Awad’s confessed reasons for traveling to Afghanistan
and the correlation of names on a list [REDACTED] clearly tied to al Qaida make it more likely than not that he knew the al Qaida fighters at the
hospital and joined them in the barricade [at the hospital]. 232

As Judge Robertson pointed out this “case against Awad is gossamer
thin.” 233 The fact that the standard can be met with such minimal evidence
stresses the importance of being clear as to what this standard determines.
There are very different ramifications for the individual if the standard determines who may be interned, targeted, or subjected to trial by military
commission. 234 Judge Bates correctly assessed that “[t]he evidence is of a
kind fit only for these unique proceedings . . . [as it] has very little
weight.” 235
In Ahmed v. Obama, Judge Gladys Kessler applied the Obama Administration standard without qualification.236 Despite the much redacted
228

Al Mutairi, Civil Action No. 02-828 at 32.
Al Odah v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2730489 *1, *17*18 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. May
19, 2009)).
230
Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379, at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009), available at http://s3.
amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/Mohammed_Ali_Awad_Trial_Court_
Decision.pdf.
231
Id. at 21.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 20.
234
See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.
235
Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379, at 20–21 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009),
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/Mohammed_Ali_
Awad_Trial_Court_Decision.pdf (emphasis added).
236
See Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2009).
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opinion, it is possible to glean factors that Judge Kessler considered do and
do not meet the standard. She granted the petitioner’s writ because the proof
did not convince her that Ahmed “fought for the Taliban”, received military
training, traveled in Afghanistan “with terrorists fleeing from the scene of
war”, or demonstrated by a stay at a guesthouse that he “was a supporter of
al-Qaida.” 237 Judge Kessler did not consider “travel[ing] around Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 in the company of terrorist fighters fleeing the battlefield” 238 to constitute substantial support. 239 However, she held that if the
Government could prove that Ahmed had joined al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban in battle against the United States and/or coalition forces, “this fact
alone would almost certainly justify . . . detention.” 240 As concerns the Government’s offer of evidence that Ahmed stayed at a guesthouse to establish
that he is “a substantial supporter of al-Qaida and/or Taliban, as well as a
trainee and fighter for one or both groups”, 241 Judge Kessler pointed out that
“[t]he validity of this argument rests in large part on a guilt-by-association
theory . . . .” 242 Judge Kessler required “solid evidence that Ali Ahmed engaged in, or planned, any future wrongdoing while” 243 there. She did not
accept guilt by association.
More recently, Judge Kessler adopted Judge Walton’s approach to
the standard of review. 244 Judge Kessler concluded that “Judge Walton’s
opinion presented a clearer approach [than Judge Bates’] . . . .” 245 In granting Al-Adahi’s petition, she determined that “[u]nable to prove the more
serious allegation of actual participation in combat, the Government cannot
rely solely on what is only associational evidence about Al-Ahadi’s stay at
[REDACTED] and arrest in the company of individuals rumored to be part
of the Taliban.” 246 Referring to the AUMF and the standards in Gherebi, 247
237

Id. at 66.
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 59.
241
Id. at 66.
242
Id. at 63.
243
Id. at 64.
244
See Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK) (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Adahi-opinion-8-2109.pdf.
245
Id. at 6.
246
Id. at 38.
247
See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68–69 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) (stating that
individuals must occupy “some sort of ‘structured’ role in the ‘hierarchy’ of the enemy
force” and “‘receive[ ] and execute[] orders’ from the enemy force’s combat apparatus”); id.
at 70–71 (stating that the President has the authority to detain persons who are members of
al-Qaeda’s armed forces).
238
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Judge Kessler concluded that the petitioner’s brief attendance at a training
camp (the Government’s strongest allegation) and eventual expulsion from
it 248 “do not bring him within the ambit of the Executive’s power to detain.” 249 Judge Kessler’s refusal to accept guilt by association is consistent
with the IHL requirement that individual determinations must be undertaken
to assess whether there is an individual nexus. 250
V. CONCLUSION
This analysis indicates that the D.C. District Court’s application of
the Bush Administration’s definition of “enemy combatant” and the refined
standard provided by the Obama Administration is in some ways narrower
and in other ways potentially broader than the IHL standards. Thus, the consistency of the D.C. District Court’s decisions with the internment standards
under IHL is mixed. Nevertheless, the court has done an admirable job in
handling certain complicated and unsettled issues under IHL, such as the
meaning of “direct participation in hostilities” and the analogous application
of “combatancy” to non-international armed conflicts.
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations and the court analogize
to IHL of international armed conflicts in determining the internment standard to be applied. However, while it may be acceptable to apply the IHL
standards of international armed conflict by analogy to non-international
armed conflict, they do not apply to “counter-terrorism” operations not
passing over the threshold into armed conflict. Thus, for any of those
individuals at Guantánamo who are not interned in relation to an armed
conflict, an IHL standard remains the wrong starting point for an internment
determination.
In their analogous application of IHL, both the Administrations and
the court analogize solely to the Third Geneva Convention. No mention is
made of the Fourth Geneva Convention. As a result, individuals meeting the
designated standard may be interned for the duration of hostilities regardless
of a change in circumstances. The one exception is Judge Huvelle, who
conducts reviews on the necessity of continued internment. While the
“combatant” standards are applied here to assess authorized internment,
other effects result under IHL if one is designated as a “combatant”, namely
that one may be directly targeted in hostilities. Thus, how the court inter248

See Al Ginco v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-1310 (RJL), at 7, 11 (D.D.C. June 22,
2009), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/janko_
unclassified_release_order.pdf.
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Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK), at 41 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Al-Adahi-opinion8-21-09.pdf.
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prets the scope of IHL here can have serious ramifications for IHL and
“warfighting” beyond internment.
Analogy limited to the Third Geneva Convention can be attributed
in part to the AUMF, which through its authorization of military force
creates an inherent nexus to combat operations. The Government may certainly choose not to exercise its full authority under IHL and thus decide to
intern only “combatants” even if the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable
to civilians provides a broader internment standard. However, if the Government wishes to comply with IHL, it cannot also extend the definition of
“combatant” beyond that provided in IHL. To some extent, the AUMF’s
expansive language opened the door to this inappropriate stretching of the
IHL standards. The D.C. District Court, however, has thus far reined in the
Administration’s standards in a manner more consistent with the definition
of “combatant” as understood under IHL.
The D.C. District Court has, as of this writing, only ruled upon few
of the numerous habeas petitions filed. While some of the factors that the
judges determined established “combatancy” raise concern of being beyond
the scope of factors acceptable under IHL, the variation in evidence as well
as much of it being classified makes it difficult to review and compare the
judges’ decisions. Additional decisions will, of course, further illuminate
the extent to which the court’s application is consistent with IHL. More
particularly, how the court’s various interpretations of the current
internment standard—provided by the Obama Administration—will be
reconciled also remains to be seen, as no court of appeals has yet clarified a
standard. 251
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One appeals court tried to do so. See Al Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir.
2008), cited in Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2009).

